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money directed to be paid by the court unless the husband is not available to
process, the wife's remedy being to cite him for contempt if he does not pay. Only
when the defendant breaches his undertaking will the "subject to discretion of
court" clause come into operation.
The majority and dissent agreed that the discretionary clause of Section 859
applied. The former distinguished an earlier decision by showing that the arrest
there depended upon the nature of the action;00 they found an abuse of discretion
in the instant case in that the arrest was only to insure defendants presence in the
jurisdiction, saying, "the deposit is not answerable for more than the defendant
himself is answerable."
The dissent by Judge Froessel evinced the opinion that there was no abuse
of discretion here, and that this case was controlled by the Standard Electric
decision 6' which the majority distinguished. This decision was written by Judge
Froessel and concurred in by the rest of the court. Thus we have the curious situa-
tion where the writer of an opinion believes it controlling and those concurring
distinguish it.
Declaratory Judgement
A telephone patron sought an accounting, injunction and declaratory judg-
ment against the telephone company, alleging an illegal collection and holding of
sales taxes. The telephone company admitted the allegations and was willing to
refund the amount illegally held upon application. The Court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 62
Under the above facts, no fiduciary relationship exists; a claim based upon
overpayment, particularly where there is no dispute as to the right to recover,
establishes no cause of action for accounting.63 The claim for declaratory judg-
ment lacks the requisite "actual controversy" for granting relief.6 4 Even assuming
a controversy, the court in its discretion could refuse to entertain the application o
"where an adequate remedy is already provided"6  (here, by resort to the Public
60. Standard Electric Equipment Corp. v. Laszkowski, 305 N. Y. 58, 110 N. E.
2d 555 (1953)-an arrest of the Defendant for misappropriation of money belonging
to the Plaintiff. Held: Plaintiff is entitled to have the deposited money applied
in satisfaction of its judgment as against the claim of the third party depositor.
61. Ibid.
62. Jacob Goodman d Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 309 N. Y. 258, 128 N. E. 2d 408
(1955); Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 106.
63. Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N. Y. 299, 28 N. E. 2d 846 (1940).
64. 5 CARmODY, Naw YORK PRACTEc §1960.
65. New York Civil Practice Act, §473; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 212.
66. Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N. Y. 140, 158 N. E. 51 (1927); James v.
Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931).
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Service Commission). The Court was also of the opinion that the prayer for
injunctive relief compelling the acquisition of new machinery could be more
adequately handled by the Public Service Commission, and that a prohibitory
injunction would interfere with the defendant's duty to collect the taxes.0 7
The dissenters would have allowed the complaint to stand as to the causes of
action for injunction and declaratory judgment. The lower courts had not, in their
discretion, dismissed 8 and the dissenters were of the opinion that a controversy
existed, the issue being not whether the phone calls were taxable but whether the
defendant could continue to force its subscribers to pay taxes not due and require
those subscribers to submit to the company's private procedures as to refunds. They
also thought direct application to the courts for injunctive relief was available here,
on the ground that where plaintiff alleges illegal collection by a public utility of
taxes not statutorily authorized, direct application for relief may be made to the
Court."9
Dead Man Statute
In a suit against the estate of plaintiff's putative father, based upon an
alleged oral contract to support the plaintiff made between plaintiff's alleged father
and maternal grandmother, the Court held, the mother was a competent witness
and the grandmother an incompetent witness under New York Civil Practice
Act §347.70 The interest which renders a witness incompetent under this section
is only such as results from the direct legal operation of the judgment. 1 Therefore,
although the effect of the agreement would be to lift from the mother the financial
burden of the child's support, her testimony is admissible.7 2
The Court's conclusion as to the competency of the grandmother was based
upon the general principle that where a person sues on a contract made for his
benefit he derives his interest from the party who furnishes the consideration.7 3
This general rule has at times been departed from,74 but for the most part has been
followed and is firmly entrenched as part of the law of this state.7 5 The dissenters
67. Administrative Code of City of New York §N41-2.0.
68. Note 65, supra.
69. Kovarslcy v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N. Y. 304, 18 N. E. 2d 287 (1938).
The majority distinguished this case on the ground that here the company claimed
the right to collect and retain the money collected.
70. Duncan v. Clarke, 308 N. Y. 282, 125 N. E. 2d 569 (1955).
71. Hobart v. Hobart, 62 N. Y. 80 (1875).
72. Connelly v. O'Conner, 117 N. Y. 91, 22 N. E. 753 (1889).
73. Rosseau v. Rouss, 180 N. Y. 116, 72 N. E. 916 (1904).
74. Ward v. N. Y. Life Ins. Go, 225 N. Y. 314, 122 N. E. 207 (1917).
75. Croker v. N. Y. Trust Co., 245 N Y. 17, 156 N E. 81 (1927); Matter of Brown-
ing's Estate, 280 N. Y. 584, 20 N. E. 2d 25 (1939).
